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LOUISIANA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION
George M. Armstrong, Jr.*
The Louisiana Condominium Act' is a poor stepchild of our civil
law heritage. It was almost born out of wedlock, as the Louisiana
Supreme Court had declared, even before its conception, that horizontal
ownership was illegitimate under a civilian understanding of property.2
The legislature nonetheless enacted condominium legislation, producing
an Act inspired more by necessity than by development of concepts
indigenous to the State's legal heritage) Although the Condominium
Act has been amended to conform its features to the terminology of
the Civil Code, it continues to be recognizable as a relative of the laws
enacted by a number of other states and even a casual inspection of
its provisions discloses its origins in the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.4
This paper will show that Louisiana condominium law need not
have had contested paternity and that the concept of horizontal own-
ership is fully compatible with civilian conceptions of property. It will
be shown that development of an indigenous conception of horizontal
ownership was impeded by early Louisiana jurisprudence, chiefly in the
area of mineral law. The principles established in those early cases were
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. Ph.D. Prin-
ceton University (1982), J.D. University of Pennsylvania (1981). Professors Winston Day
and Lee Hargrave offered many useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. John
LaMaster was my research assistant during preparation of the essay.
1. La. R.S. 9:1121.101 through 9:1124.117 enacted in 1979. The current Act had
two predecessors: 1962 La. Acts No. 494 §§ 1-22, and 1974 La. Acts No. 502 § 1. The
history of our condominium legislation is discussed infra notes 37-44 and accompanying
text.
2. Lasyone v. Emerson, 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952).
3. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
4. The Uniform Condominium Act was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1977. Louisiana adopted a modified form of the Uniform Act in 1979.
1979 La. Acts No. 682 § 1. The 1977 Uniform Act was adopted by Minnesota, Pennsylvania
and West Virginia. This Act was revised in 1980 and the revised version has been adopted
in Maine, Missouri, New Mexico and Rhode Island. All fifty states have condominium
legislation. Most states which have not followed the uniform legislation have adopted
modified forms of Puerto Rican legislation, the first such statute in the United States,
adopted in 1958, or the 1962 Federal Housing Administration model condominium statute.
7 Unif. L. Ann. 216 (Supp. 1984).
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later extrapolated into the area of air rights where they led the courts
to inappropriate results. Had the courts recognized that ownership of
air above the soil is subject to different policies than ownership of oil
below the soil, the resulting jurisprudence might have retained the flex-
ibility to permit development of a civilian approach to condominiums.
My argument is based in part on a criticism of Louisiana juris-
prudence and in part on a comparison with French and Spanish law.
The French experience shows that horizontal ownership is compatible
with a civilian understanding of property and that a civilian system can
permit condominium ownership without any special legislation. The Span-
ish experience is relevant to show how legislation in Louisiana might
have reformed our early jurisprudence and developed an approach to
condominiums within the framework of the civil law system. In Spain,
as in Louisiana, early jurisprudence precluded a regime of horizontal
ownership. In Spain, however, the legislature responded to this situation
by correcting the jurisprudence and creating a framework for condom-
inium development within the existing body of rules governing ownership
in common. Our legislature, on the other hand, reached outside the
civilian tradition and adopted a modified form of the condominium
legislation in force in common law states.
The principal purpose of this paper is not to criticize the Louisiana
Condominium Act. Although there are areas in which our legislation
might be revised on the basis of the Spanish model, there appears to
be no evidence that our statute fails to serve the needs of purchasers,
developers, and the state. This essay is not an academic exercise in the
realm of the "what might have been," but rather a plea that future
law reform take place in the context of civilian heritage.
THE LOUISIANA BACKGROUND OF HORIZONTAL OWNERSHIP
In 1913 Cas Moss owned a two story brick house situated in Winn-
field.' The owner, then an attorney and later a district judge, sold to
the Winnfield Drug Company an undivided one-half interest in the lot
and building and agreed that "the Vendee shall have the use, without
rental, of the lower story of the two story brick building." '6 Cas Moss
kept the use of the upper story to himself and the agreement recited
that he "retain[ed] the stairway which is to remain intact and kept as
means of ingress and egress to second story."' In 1915 Cas Moss sold
his undivided one-half interest to the Knights of Pythias. The background
indicates that, since at least 1901, the two stories had been separately
occupied."
5. Lasyone v. Emerson, 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952).
6. Id. at 955, 57 So. 2d at 907.
7. Id.
8. Although the two stories may have been separately occupied before 1901, a deed
recorded in that year which effected a conveyance of the property "except the upper
story, which belongs to and is of present use as a lodge hall by Eastern Star Lodge,"
conclusively established separate occupancy by 1901. Id. at 958, 57 So. 2d at 908.
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After 1901 the occupants of each story conveyed whatever interest
in the property they owned several times, and "[a]ll subsequent deeds
affecting this property make reference to the two original conveyances. ' "
After the building had been held in this fashion for more than fifty
years, Juanita Lasyone, who held the upper story, became dissatisfied
with the arrangement and sued for partition. Emerson, who resided
below, demurred, contending, among other things, that the conveyances
by Cas Moss had severed the building into two horizontal estates.'"
Despite the language in that conveyance which provided that the
grantees were to have the "use"'' of the lower story, there was ample
basis for determining that a severance had occurred. The document
provided that the grantees had a one half interest in the walls, 2 implying
that the air space within the walls was separately owned. The grantor
retained the stairway, not merely the use of the stairway, to the second
floor. Moreover, the agreement provided that the grantee might extend
the lower story one hundred feet and hold this structural addition as
individual property. 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, however, that Cas Moss
intended only to convey an undivided one-half interest in the property,
to grant a usufruct in the lower story to the Winnfield Drug Company,
and to retain a usufruct in the upper story for himself. 4 Even if
horizontal division had been the intention of the parties, Louisiana law
could not countenance such a state of affairs."' The court found it
necessary to reach this conclusion after determining that the parties were
owners in common and therefore either of them could request a par-
tition. 6 The owners of the lower story requested a partition in kind,
but the court found that this horizontal division of a building was not
possible because the "various forms of tenure of real property permitted
in common law states which are irreconcilable with the provisions of
the Civil Code cannot receive the sanction of our courts."'
17
In fact the supreme court had sanctioned the heresy of horizontal
ownership twenty-one years earlier in the case of Price v. Town of
Ruston.'8 In that instance Mrs. Price, the owner of a two story building,
sold the right to build a third story atop her structure to the Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks. Encountering financial difficulties, the
Elks borrowed $3,500 from the Ruston Building and Loan Association
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 958, 57 So. 2d 908.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 958, 57 So. 2d 908.
15. Id. at 960, 57 So. 2d 909.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 171 La. 985, 132 So. 653 (1931).
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"secured," in the words of the court, by a "mortgage" on the third
story.' 9 The controversy from which the case arose involved an attempt
by Mrs. Price to exercise a right of first refusal in a foreclosure sale
of the third floor to the Town of Ruston. The point, however, is that
Mrs. Price, the Town of Ruston, the Building and Loan Association,
the Elks and the supreme court all treated the upper story as a separate
piece of property.
In Lasyone the court concluded that horizontal ownership was in-
compatible with a civilian understanding of property on the basis of
both article 505 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and the famous
mineral rights case, Frost-Johnson Lumber Company v. Salling's Heirs.20
Article 505 provided that "The ownership of the soil carries with it the
ownership of all that is directly above and under it." It did not provide,
however, that matter above and below the soil was inalienable by the
owner, and article 506 complimented this notion by stating that the soil
owner's property in buildings on his ground was only a rebuttable
presumption.2 In fact, Louisiana jurisprudence had permitted a person
to own a building on the land of another since at least 1874.22 This
right implied the ability of the owner of the ground to alienate rights
in the air above the soil.
Frost-Johnson Lumber Company"3 involved an attempt by the gran-
tor of land to reserve ownership of the minerals below the soil. The
minerals were oil and gas, and the case concluded that oil and gas in
place are insusceptible of ownership. 24 Any attempt to retain ownership
reserves in the grantor only a right to explore for and extract minerals. 25
The court reached this conclusion on the basis of the misconception,
widely shared at the time, that oil and gas were migratory.2 6 Its purpose
may have been to give Louisiana land owners the benefit of the ten-
year prescriptive period applicable to the non-use of servitudes. The
authors of the numerous opinions in the case might be surprised to
learn that they have been credited with adhering to a civilian rejection
of horizontal ownership.2 7 Not only were no civilian authorities cited
19. Id. at 987-90, 132 So. at 655.
20. Lasyone, 220 La. at 959-60, 57 So. 2d at 909.
21. "Horizontal ownership of buildings and ownership of individual apartments was
implicitly recognized by the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870." A. Yiannopoulos, Property
§ 97, at 295, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
22. Augustin v. Dours, 26 La. Ann. 261 (1874).
23. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
24. Id. at 858, 91 So. 243.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Lasyone, 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906. Professor Daggett has written of the holding
in Frost-Johnson, "In the main, however, the nonownership theory was grounded upon
the simple civilian concept of land tenure which recognizes but two kinds of estates in
lands - full ownership and servitude." H. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana 2-3
(1939). Professor Daggett was wrong, I believe, in attributing the holding of Frost-Johnson
to civilian notions. Nonetheless, her error has influenced two generations of Louisiana
law students. Estates may be limited to full ownership and servitudes without precluding
the possibility of separate horizontal ownership interests.
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for the proposition that the subsoil could not be separately owned, but
the court noted, "we find with much satisfaction that our jurispurdence
is in complete harmony with that which prevails throughout the land." 2
Had the Louisiana Supreme Court been inclined in Lasyone to permit
horizontal ownership, it could have distinguished air rights from mineral
rights by following the line of jurisprudence which permitted ownership
of buildings separate from the soil below.2 9 Residents of separate floors
would then be secure in their continued ownership of the separate parcels
of air space which comprise their individual property. However, permitting
separate ownership of air rights would not resolve conflicts over property
which the parties continued to own in common. In even a simple
condominium arrangement involving a single structure, the exterior walls,
stairs, structural support, plumbing, and heating and cooling apparatus,
not to mention the ground beneath the building, are generally common
property of the apartment owners. The occupants require assurance that
a disgruntled member of the community will not upset the scheme by
bringing an action for partition of the common property.
Any co-owner of property has a right to demand partition, 0 and
an agreement between owners that there should never be a partition is
void. " Moreover the right to partition cannot be prescribed against.32
The only codal provision which would appear to require a person to
remain in perpetual co-ownership is Louisiana Civil Code Article 1303
which prohibits partition "when the use of the thing held in common
is indispensable" to the co-owners such as "an entry which serves as
a passage to several houses, or a way common to several estates, and
other things of the same kind.
'3
There appears to be no reported case in which Louisiana courts
have been asked to apply article 1303 to require ownership in common
of property necessary for the enjoyment of separate estates. In the only
case which has cited this provision of the Code, the supreme court held
that judicial partition in kind of an oil field was impossible but a co-
owner might effect partition by licitation. 34 The case could be read to
28. Frost-Johnson, 150 La. at 858, 91 So. at 243. The Court cited the jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court, and the American and English Encyclopedia of Law
which in turn cites numerous common law cases.
29. Long before the revision of 1978, the law considered buildings to be separate
immovables when they belonged to someone other than the owner of the soil. "ITihe
assumption of horizontal indivisibility of immovable property was discarded and courts
began to hold that buildings were susceptible of ownership and other real rights as separate
immovables." A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 21, § 94, at 287.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 1289.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 1297.
32. La. Civ. Code art. 1304.
33. See also, L. Oppenheim, Successions and Donations § 92, at 174, in 10 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1973).
34. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Hayne, 138 La. 555, 70 So. 509 (1916).
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hold that a co-owner may always obtain partition by licitation, for the
court states that "where equality cannot be had by a partition in kind,
the partition must be by licitation." 5 Moreover, article 1303 only requires
that property remain in indivision if it is "indispensable" to the en-
joyment of the separate estates. This provision might protect the apart-
ment owners from partition of the plumbing and ground beneath the
building, but it probably would not save the tennis courts, swimming
pools, and commonly owned hot tubs from judicial auction.
The two legal pillars on which the modern condominium scheme
stands, separate ownership of air rights severed from the soil36 and
compulsory indivision of the common property which serves the indi-
vidual apartments, were absent from Louisiana law at the beginning of
the 1960's. The condominium form of ownership was becoming more
popular at that time, especially in states with significant urban popu-
lations. Special legislation was not necessary outside Louisiana to enable
condominium development because the common law permitted ownership
of air rights separate from the soil, and owners of property in common
could contract to hold it in indivision. 3
7
To encourage condominium development Congress amended the Na-
tional Housing Act in 1961, authorizing Federal Housing Authority
insured mortgages for condominiums in states where that form of own-
ership was authorized by local law.38 The following year the Louisiana
legislature adopted the Horizontal Property Act. 39 The impetus for this
legislation was the availability of mortgages rather than local demand
as Louisiana experienced little condominium development prior to 1970.40
Apparently, the legislature was not inclined to reinvent the wheel
and relied on neighboring legislation, adopting Arkansas' condominium
statute verbatim. Unfortunately the Act, as adopted, contained an em-
barrassing reference to the right of persons to own an apartment "as
joint tenants, as tenants in common, as tenants by the entirety or in
any other real estate tenancy relationship recognized under the law of
this state." '4' Louisiana legal scholars demanded that the Act be declared
unconstitutional as an incorporation of foreign legal principles by ref-
35. Id. at 559, 70 So. at 511.
36. The owner of a modern condominium has exclusive ownership of only a cube
of air space suspended above the ground.
37. 4A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 611, at 642-43 (1982). See Yeshiva
University v. Edelman, 176 N.Y.S.2d 534, 16 Misc. 2d 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (holding
that an agreement between co-owners that no partition action would be commenced was
valid). On separate ownership of air rights, see 4A R. Powell, supra, at 263.5[1][C];
Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 69 N.E. 625 (1903).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (Y) (1982).
39. See Theriot, Louisiana Condominum Act of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1203 (1975)
for an account of this saga.
40. Id. at 1204.
41. La. R.S. 9:1125 (1965), 1962 La. Acts No. 494 § 5.
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erence.42 Ironically, Arkansas had copied Puerto Rican legislation, al-
tering the civilian terminology in that statute to suit common law needs.
The Louisiana Law Institute undertook a study of the Horizontal
Property Act in 1971.41 Although the available correspondence indicates
that the revision committee was interested in incorporating the experience
of Latin American countries into its study, neither the archival records
nor the text of the Act as proposed in 1974 discloses any civilian influence
on that statute. The Act of 1974 remained in force until 1979 when
the legislature adopted the present Act.44
CIVIL LAW TRADITION
Although modern scholarship maintains that horizontal ownership
of immovable property was generally prohibited under Roman law, 45
civilians searching for antecedents to the contemporary rules permitting
individual ownership of apartments have discovered a handful of texts
indicating that some dwellings combined separate ownership of living
space with common ownership of passages and doorways.4 6 A Spanish
scholar has found that "this form of ownership appears to have been
known in the middle ages and the cause seems to have been the difficulty
of living within the precincts of the city walls. Medieval ordinances of
Italian and French cities such as the coutume of Orleans, for example,
deal with this kind of property. ' 47 In Scotland, individual ownership in
apartments combined with a common interest of each owner in the
ground, structural support, and roof seems to have been well established
by the beginning of the nineteenth century. 48
The French experience is most relevant to Louisiana owing to the
influence of the Code Napoleon upon the Louisiana Civil Code. Using
the same codal provisions contained in the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, the French fashioned a rationale for horizontal ownership. Ac-
42. Pascal, Louisiana Legislation of 1962: A Symposium-Civil Code and Related
Legislation, 23 La. L. Rev. 41 (1962); Comment, The Condominum: Apartment Ownership
in Louisiana, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 482 (1963). The offending language was amended by 1968
La. Acts Ex. Sess. No. 17 § I.
43. Unpublished correspondence of the Louisiana Law Institute.
44. 1979 La. Acts No. 682 § 1.
45. "According to traditional Romanist doctrine, immovable property is not suscep-
tible of horizontal division; buildings and other constructions having their foundation in
the soil necessarily belong to the owner of the ground." A. Yiannopoulos, supra note
21, § 94, at 286, and sources cited therein.
46. "Another text of Ulpian, not very clear (D. XLIII, 17, Uti possidetis, 3 and 7)
serves as an antecedent to conclude that, in Rome, at times the superstructure was given
to different persons in the different stories of one building with common use of an exit
to public places." A. Ventura - Traveset y Hernindez, Derecho de Propiedad Horizontal
13 (1976).
47. Id. at 14.
48. D. Walker, 11 Principles of Scottish Private Law 1262-63 (1970).
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cording to Aubry and Rau, the task of constructing a doctrine governing
co-ownership of single things fell to treatise writers who used "the
statutory principles furnished by the titles on ownership, successions and
partnership contract.
49
The task of treatise writers developing a concept of apartment own-
ership was facilitated by the absence of a prohibition on alienation of
the subsoil. French Civil Code article 552, which corresponds to article
505 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, provides that the ownership
of the soil includes "the ownership of what is above and beneath it."
Planiol states, however, that "Mines form an immovable property dis-
tinct from the surface. There are therefore two superimposed properties
existing upon the same spot, the ground and the mine. Each of them
may be sold, mortgaged, seized, etc., separately from the other and
conformably with the general rules applicable to landed property." 50
French article 553, corresponding to artidie 506 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, was interpreted to create only a presumption that the
owner of the soil owned all superficies. They are presumed to belong
to the owner of the soil "if the contrary is not proved," and as Planiol
states: "The contrary is thus possible, that is to say, the buildings may
belong to a person other than the owner of the soil ... 
The possibility of horizontal ownership provided the first necessary
legal pillar for condominiums in France. The second pillar, forced in-
division of common areas, was also built by interpretation of codal
provisions similar to those in the Louisiana Civil Code. French Civil
Code article 815 provides: "Each co-owner may request at any time the
partition of the common property, unless it is subject, by its nature or
designation, to a forced undivided ownership." French authorities main-
tain that the co-ownership of things which are indispensable accessories
"for the common use of two or more estates belonging to different
owners, the very designation of these things imposes on them the state
of forced undivided coownership." 2 Planiol notes that the soil, main
walls, roofs, out buildings, and toilets of structures in which individuals
own separate dwellings are owned in common."
Condominium ownership developed in France on the foundation of
the same legal principles which were available to Louisiana jurisprudence.
The legal systems of the two jurisdictions probably used these codal
provisions differently owing to contrasting economic and social condi-
tions. Our judges understandably viewed the state's endowment of min-
eral resources as an important factor in Louisiana property law and it
49. 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 221, at 385 (P. Esmein 7th ed.
1961) in 2 Civil Law Translations (J. Mayda trans. 1966).
50. I M. Planiol, Treatise on The Civil Law 2403 (1959).
51. Id. at 2525.
52. 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 49, § 221, at 393.
53. M. Planiol, supra note 50, at 2522.
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is not surprising that any discussion of division of property first con-
sidered the possible impact of the jurisprudence on mineral rights. In
France, on the other hand, the need for urban housing following the
First World War was an important factor which influenced interpretation
of these codal provisions. Thus, no special legislation was necessary in
that country to permit condominium ownership.
The French experience demonstrates that Louisiana might have de-
veloped through case law horizontal ownership of dwelling space without
distorting any principles of the civilian tradition. The Spanish experience,
in contrast, shows that a legislator may create a civilian framework for
condominium ownership when existing jurisprudence is an obstacle as
it was in Louisiana. Legislation was necessary in Spain because the
courts obstinately refused to apply a codal provision which permitted
separate ownership of floors in a building.
Article 396 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1888 began, "when the
different stories of one house belong to different owners, if the owners
of the property do not establish the bases on which they should contribute
to necessary works and there exists no agreement on this, the following
rules should be observed: . . ." Early jurisprudence of the Supreme
Tribunal consistently interpreted this provision to permit only a form
of co-ownership of buildings, probably because the article appears in
the title on ownership in common (comunidad de bienes). Setting aside
the judgment of a trial court which denied a suit for partition of a
horizontally divided building, the court wrote: "Among co-owners of
houses whose different stories belong to different owners there exists a
community of ownership to which Article 392 refers . . . . 4 The trial
court's denial of dissolution "on the grounds that ownership in common
does not exist" conflicts, the Superior Tribunal continued, with the
provisions regulating partition of common property. In another case the
court found that article 396 "cannot be the basis for a claim that a
house held in indivision be divided in the form here provided for this
would in every case change the form of the co-ownership." 55
Commentators considered this interpretation of the Spanish Code
incorrect. The original inadequacy of the first article 396, aggravated
by jurisprudential interpretation, permitted authorities to "sieze hold of
the doctrine that ownership by floors was a form of ordinary ownership
in common (of comunidad juris romani) and tending to apply to it the
rules of the latter ... fundamentally injured the institution .... -16
Judges and legal authorities "became obsessed with the idea that hor-
izontal ownership was a form of ownership in common .... The second
obsession of our jurists was the action of partition with which the owner of
54. Judgment of the First Chamber pertaining to Civil Matters of the Supreme
Tribunal, 18 March 1897.
55. Judgment of the First Chamber pertaining to Civil Matters of the Supreme
Tribunal, 14 June 1895.
56. A. Ventura - Traveset y Herndndez, supra note 46, at 33.
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one story could petition for the cessation of the state of indivision . . .,,"
Interpreting horizontal ownership as a type of ownership in common
need not have entailed a right to partition in every case because the Spanish
Code, like those of France and Louisiana, provided that there could be no
partition of property "when to do so would render it unserviceable for the
use to which it is assigned." 5 Authorities interpreted this provision to mean
that a co-owner could request partition by licitation where partition in kind
was not feasible.59
The intransigence of the Spanish courts to horizontal ownership is sur-
prising in view of the common occurrence of this form of property as a
matter of custom.6' It is even more surprising inasmuch as the Ley Hipote-
caria of 1871 recognized the practice of separate ownership of stories and
apartments, providing that a mortgage of a separate story or unit should be
recorded in the Registry's folio for the building which contained the apart-
ment.6
SPAIN'S STATUTORY RESPONSE
Spanish jurisprudence inhibited the growth of the condominium form
of ownership because the courts construed horizontal ownership as a
form of ownership in common and permitted any member of the con-
dominium community to seek partition of the building by licitation.
Following the Spanish Civil War, the growth in demand for urban
housing encouraged the government to revise article 396.62 As revised,
57. Id. at 19.
58. C6digo Civil Espafiol art. 401 (14th edition).
59. "No co-owner shall be obligated, by the sole fact that the property is not divisible,
to remain in the community, but on the contrary, may ask at any time that it be dissolved,
not dividing the thing or adjudicating it all to one with indemnification of the others,
but selling it and dividing the price." D. Jos6 Maria Manresa y Navarro, Comentarios
al C6digo Civil Espafhol 492 (1934). See also, Calixto Valverde y Valverde, Tratado de
Derecho Civil Espafiol 259-60 (1925).
60. A. Ventura - Traveset y Hern.ndez, supra note 46, at 20.
61. Ley Hipotecaria art. 8 para. 3. "There shall be considered as one parcel, for
purposes of inscription in the Registry under one number: . . . Every urban parcel and
every building, though it belong in defined proportions, apartments or stories to different
owners, in full ownership or less than complete ownership."
62. The different floors or locations of a building or its parts susceptible to in-
dependent use by reason of having their own exit to a common area or public
thoroughfare may be the object of separate ownership which shall carry an
inherent right of coownership over the other elements of the building necessary
for adequate use and enjoyment such as the soil, roof, foundations, halls, walls,
drainage, stairs, porter's quarters, elevators, corridors, cupboards, plumbing,
and servitudes.
The parts in coownership shall in no case be susceptible of division and may
only be alienated, seized or burdened jointly with the specific particular part
to which it is inseparably annexed.
On case of alienation of a floor or area, the owners of the others, under
this title only, shall not have the right of tanteo or of retracto.
This form of ownership is regulated by special legal provisions and, insofar
as these regulations permit, by the will of the parties. C6digo Civil Espafiol
art. 396 (14th edition); see also A. Ventura - Traveset y Herndndez, supra note 46, at 33-34.
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the Spanish Civil Code provided for separate ownership of dwelling
units with ownership in common of areas necessary for enjoyment of
these units. The parts held in indivision could not be partitioned. Codal
provisions regulating horizontal property remained a part of the title
regulating ownership in common. The legislature merely created a new
type of ownership in common for property which was attached to parcels
of separately owned property and could not be partitioned.
This statutory modification protected the owners of floors in divided
buildings and permitted them to agree upon allocation of expenses
connected with maintenance of the structure. It was probably adequate
regulation for any structure involving no more than three or four res-
idential units and demonstrates that simple condominium arrangements
do not require an elaborate statutory framework.
Construction of larger condominium projects brought more sources
of friction between residents and increased the role of real estate de-
velopers who, in Spain as in the United States, imposed building reg-
ulations which were not always in the interests of purchasers. 63 In 1960
the government enacted the Horizontal Property Act which retained the
concept of the condominium as a species of ownership in common while
providing a statutory framework for self-government by the co-owners.64
In this respect, Spain's horizontal property legislation is similar to Lou-
isiana's regulation of matrimonial property.
The Exposition de Motivos of the law maintains that the legislature
developed a new form of ownership on the basis of concepts of common
ownership. Horizontal property is a modification of ownership in com-
mon (comunidad de bienes). The development of this institution tended
to emphasize the characteristics which distinguish it from ownership in
common. The reform of 1939, the Motivos state, recognized the indi-
vidual ownership of units, leaving the common property as an accessory.
The Horizontal Property Act of 1960 increases individual control over
the separately owned property inasmuch as the purpose of the common
63. There was an explosion of condominium development in the 1950's. "The diffusion
[of this form of ownership] has been so great that one may state with absolute certainty
that the majority of urban owners live today in this relatively new legal institution." Luis
Mufioz Gonzalez, La Propiedad Horizontal 7 (1979). "[Tihat which was little more than
fifteen years ago a novelty in Spanish cities, horizontal property, is practically the only
form in which new buildings take refuge." Batista, Comunidad Para Edificar, 53 Revista
de Derecho Privado 99 (1969).
The Expositioh de Motivos notes that consumer protection had become necessary by 1960,
observing that the 1960 law offers great attention to the rights and duties of co-owners:
Until now ... this matter has been given over almost entirely to private
autonomy as reflected in the bylaws. These frequently were not the fruit of
free negotiation by the parties but, ordinarily, they were dictated ... by the
promoter of the construction enterprise. Those entering the regime of horizontal
property being limited to acquiescing.
64. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, 21 July 1960, de la Jefatura del
Estado.
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elements is to serve the apartments and not the other way around. One
Spanish commentator observes that this law uses existing legal norms
to regulate a novel social development.6 1 "In truth, horizontal property
is sui generis; it has initiated a distinct modern discipline with regulation
distinct from ownership in common." 6 6
Creating the Horizontal Property Regime
A Spanish horizontal property regime exists whenever ownership of
parts of a building is divided among different proprietors and other
areas are held in common. Conveyance of an upper story to another
person by one who had owned the entire building would create a regime
of horizontal ownership subject to the Horizontal Property Act. 67 No
agreement or public act is necessary. A simple condominium scheme is
possible within this framework without any written agreement defining
the rights of the owners and without any registration; a salutary flexibility
which the Louisiana Condominium Act lacks. 61
The Spanish law permits, but does not require, the co-owners to
formalize their respective rights by executing a charter (titulo constitutivo)
of the regime which contains much the same information which Loui-
siana's Act requires in a declaration of condominium. 69 If the apartments
have not yet been sold the developer would prepare this document.
Although the charter must be registered to affect third parties, Spanish
authorities state emphatically that registration creates no new legal entity
and failure to register does not alter relations among the owners.7" In
fact the Spanish regime of horizontal property is not a legal entity.7
65. 2 F. Puig Pefia, Compendio de Derecho Civil Espahol, Derechos Reales 279
(1976).
66. Id. at 278.
67. A. Ventura - Traveset y Hernandez, supra note 46, at 193.
68. La. R.S. 9:1122.101, and 1122.105 specify the contents of the declaration.
69. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, Art. 5, 21 July 1960, de la Jefatura
del Estado.
70. A. Ventura - Traveset y Hernndez, supra note 46, at 193, citing a decision of
the Supreme Tribunal:
The titulo constitutivo to which Article 5 of the law refers does not give birth
to the horizontal property which is derived from the law itself when the ac-
quisition of different stories occurs. The cited Article has another significance,
that of joining and regulating those rights which the law grants to the owners
of the different stories.
See also, J. Caballero Gea, La Propiedad Horizontal: La Problematica Judicial 42 (1983).
The juridical statute of ownership neither creates a distinct social entity of the
components with patrimony different from its members nor does it modify the
elements which belong to each of them from the moment of acquisition. The
regim6 of horizontal property pursues no object other than directing those rights
which already belonged to the co-owners...
71. Some Spanish authorities believe this state of affairs to be disadvantageous.
"Recognition of the legal personality of the Board of Owners . . . would not be badly
received." R. Pascal, Propiedad Horizontal, 60 Revista de Derecho Privado 867, 875
(1976).
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Although other provisions of the Spanish Act permit the condominium
community to sue and be sued and to transact business in its own
name,72 the community as such has no authority other than that which
the individual owners would have acting alone.7 3 As a consequence of
this absence of legal personality, co-owners may sue one another for
violation of the charter or regulations and are not dependent on the
board of co-owners to protect their rights."
As a form of co-ownership, the Spanish condominium arrangement
is a legal relationship among the parties, not a distinct entity. In this
respect it is similar to a spousal community or community of heirship
under Spanish law. Louisiana, in contrast, permits the association of
unit owners to incorporate so that for some purposes owners relate to
one another as shareholders and must redress grievances through the
Association of Owners.75
Property Subject to the Regime
In Spain, as in Louisiana, government of the regim& is founded on
two basic documents: the charter or declaration of condominium and
the bylaws. Under current Spanish practice, the charter will ordinarily
be promulgated by a developer. 76 In Louisiana the declaration may only
be executed "by the owner of the immovable property to be conveyed"
to the condominium regim6.77 Inasmuch as the Louisiana Civil Code
permits separate ownership of floors only within the framework of the
Condominium Act, 7  and the declaration of condominium creates the
regim6, 79 the declarant is always the owner of the entire immovable
property. In Spain, on the other hand, the charter does not constitute
the regime because horizontal ownership is permitted outside the law
on horizontal property.8" The apartment owners may collectively and
72. See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
73. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 48.
74. See infra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
75. La. R.S. 9:1123.101 (Supp. 1985). Although there is no jurisprudence on this
point, a condominium unit owner probably has standing to bring an action under Civil
Code articles 667-669 for causing him inconvenience in his use of the property. If the
unit owner's complaint is the failure of his neighbor to abide by the provisions of the
declaration or bylaws, redress should be limited to corporate channels. La. R.S. 9:1123.102(11)
(Supp. 1985), La. R.S. 1123.115 (Supp. 1985). La. Civ. Code art. 436 provides,
The estate and rights of a corporation belong so completely to the body, that
none of the individuals who compose it, can dispose of any part of them.
In this respect the thing belonging to a body, is very different from a thing
which is common to several individuals, as respects the share which everyone
has in the partnership which exists between them.
76. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 42.
77. La. R.S. 9:1122:101 (Supp. 1985).
78. La. Civ. Code art. 492.
79. La. R.S. 9:1122.101 (Supp. 1985).
80. A. Ventura - Traveset y Herndndez, supra note 46, at 67-68 and accompanying
text; C6igo Civil Espafiol art. 396 (14th edition).
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unanimously execute and register a charter,8' or it may be executed by
a developer who owns the entire property. A Louisiana condominium
unit owner's association may amend the declaration by a decision of
sixty-seven percent of the allotted votes, "2 whereas Spanish unit owners
must unanimously concur in any amendment." Bylaws in Spain and
Louisiana are ordinarily adopted by majority vote.8 4
In both jurisdictions the most important feature of the declaration
or charter is delineation of the individual units and assignment of each
unit's share in the common property.8" In Spain, any alteration in the
designation or use of the common property requires amendment of the
charter.8 6 The Louisiana Act requires only a vote of the association to
redesignate common areas.8" Louisiana law provides substantially more
flexibility to the condominium community. One dissenting vote in a
Spanish board of owners may block useful alterations of the common
elements. The only remedy of the majority is legal action against the
dissenter alleging that he is acting with fraud or against the interest of
the community.88 The procedure is cumbersome even if it is successful,
and Spanish commentators complain that the law on horizontal property
relies excessively on judicial enforcement of majority interests.8 9 The
requirement of unanimity of owners is, however, a characteristic of the
regime of ownership in common. This characteristic is appropriate when
co-owners of a pasture are deciding whether to lease mineral rights but
not appropriate where the purpose of the common property is to serve
separately owned apartments.
The same problems occur if a unit owner acquires an adjoining
apartment and wishes to connect the two dwellings. Louisiana does not
require him to obtain approval of the association, provided he does not
impair the structural integrity of the building.90 Spanish authorities, in
contrast, are preoccupied with the effect of such an alteration on the
distribution of voting power within the residential community because
votes are allocated by floor space. 9' These authorities require the owner
81. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 42.
82. La. R.S. 9:1122.119 (Supp. 1985).
83. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num 49/1960, art. 16, para. 1, 21 July 1960, de
la Jefatura del Estado; Mufioz Gonzalez, supra note 63, at 203.
84. The Louisiana Act does not specify the number of votes needed to amend the
bylaws. The declaration or articles of incorporation might, of course, require a super
majority. La. R.S. 9:1123.102 (Supp. 1985). Spanish law requires a majority of the owners
and a majority of the vote as allotted by floor space.
85. La. R.S. 9:1122.105 (Supp. 1985). Law on Horizontal Property art. 5.
86. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 16 1 1, 21 July 1960, de la
Jefatura del Estado.
87. La. R.S. 9:1123.102(6) (Supp. 1985).
88. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 121.
89. A. Ventura - Traveset y Herndndez, supra note 46, at 56.
90. La. R.S. 9:1122.113(3) (Supp. 1985).
91. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 4, 21 July 1960, de la Jefatura
del Estado.
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to obtain the unanimous consent of the board . 2 Approval is also required
because alteration of a wall between units modifies common property.93
Governance of the Regime
Louisiana entrusts government of the community to the collective
unit owners.94 If a condominium unit owners' association is organized
as a corporation, the board of directors may exercise any powers con-
ferred on them by statutes, articles of incorporation, and bylaws. Using
a corporate structure, the association may confer considerable authority
on the directors and free itself of responsibility for management of the
community.95
The owners of apartments, constituted as the board of owners, also
govern a Spanish condominium community; however, there is little or-
ganizational similarity between this board and its Louisiana counterpart.96
The board is not a legal entity, and it does not delegate authority to
any executive body. Final authority for all decisions resides in the owners
acting collectively. If the horizontal property community is large enough
to require budgets of expenditures and revenues, these may be prepared
by committees, but they must be approved by a majority of owners. 97
A Louisiana condominium association organized as a non profit cor-
poration may amend its bylaws by action of the directors or members,98
whereas such amendments in Spain require action by a majority of
owners .
There are other consequences to classifying the community as a
corporation or as a form of ownership in common. A disgruntled
Louisiana condominium owner, dissatisfied with a bylaw adopted by a
majority of the directors or members, has no redress unless he can
allege that the rule is illegal. Recent judicial decisions in Florida up-
holding condominium regulations which exclude children from the com-
plex prove that regulations severely disadvantageous to a minority of
owners may nonetheless be valid.' ° In Spain, however, where the com-
92. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 30; J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 125.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
94. La. R.S. 9:1123.102 (Supp. 1985).
95. La. R.S. 12:224 (1969).
96. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 13, 21 July 1960, de la Jefatura
del Estado.
97. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 246, The law makes no provision for an executive
committee. A model charter defines the functions of any executive counsel and the board
of owners.
98. La. R.S. 12:222 (1969 and Supp. 1985).
99. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 16, para. 2, 21 July 1960, de
la Jefatura del Estado.
100. Star Lake North Commodore Ass'n v. Parker, 423 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982). See also Hidden Harbor Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (approving regulations which prohibit unit owners from drinking alcoholic
beverages in common areas).
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munity is a form of ownership in common, a regulation which has a
disproportionate impact on some owners is viewed as having the effect
of excluding them from enjoyment of the common property, and judicial
intervention is more easily obtained. If Louisiana law interpreted the
condominium as a form of ownership in common, our courts might
follow the same analysis.' 0'
Spanish law on horizontal property permits any owner to bring suit
challenging a decision of the majority which is illegal or contrary to
the charter.0 2 In addition, a group representing at least a quarter of
the owners may challenge a decision which is "gravely prejudicial"
against them.'0 3 Summarizing the jurisprudence on this point, Mufioz
defines "gravely prejudicial" as "an injury in an obvious and important
manner to the interests of one or more owners" such as a decision to
limit the supply of heat, supplied from a common source, to a few
hours each day."' 4 Thus, a gravely prejudicial regulation need not even
be discriminatory, only damaging to the interests of some owners, lim-
iting their enjoyment of the property.
Relations Among Unit Owners
Collective Action
In Louisiana the condominium association acquires authority over
the deportment of individual residents through its power to make reg-
ulations, to levy fines for their violation, and to obtain injunctions
against continuing violations. 05 Because condominiums are a recent phe-
nomenon in Louisiana, there is little experience with attempts to enforce
these regulations through the courts. In Florida, where condominiums
are more common, courts have permitted associations to regulate com-
mon areasft and activities entirely within the owner's dwelling spaces
provided the regulations are not illegal, discriminatory, retroactive, vague
or otherwise deficient. 07 Florida courts have upheld regulations which
101. See LeBlanc v. Scurto, 173 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
102. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 16, para. 4, 21 July 1960, de
la Jefatura del Estado. A decision is contrary to law when it infringes a prohibition or
imperative precept contained in the law on Horizontal Property. A decision is contrary to
the charter when it does not respect a group of provisions which specify the rights and
obligations of the co-owners relating to the use or purpose of the building in its entirety,
its administration, conservation, and repair. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 75.
Mufioz, supra note 63, at 75.
103. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 16, para. 3, 21 July 1960, de
la Jefatura del Estado.
104. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 75.
105. La. R.S. 9:1123.102(11) (Supp. 1985)
106. See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
107. White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
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limit occupancy to people of certain ages,108 prohibit leasing of units 0 9
or ownership of pets,"0 and restrict occupancy to members of a single
family."' In addition, there is no reason to suppose that the association
could not bring suit on behalf of all the owners in the event that one
resident was conducting an activity in his dwelling which threatened the
health or safety of others members or inconvenienced them in the use
of their property even if regulations did not specifically prohibit the
activity.'"
A Spanish horizontal property community has similar rights with a
few important distinctions. Although the community may adopt regu-
lations on the use of dwelling units, misconduct of a member is viewed
conceptually as an injury to the enjoyment of the common property by
other residents, rather than as breach of a rule. Standing to seek redress
lies with the other co-owners rather than the rule making body.
Article 394 of the Spanish Civil Code, which applies to horizontal
property and to other types of ownership in common provides: "Every
participant may serve himself from the common property so long as he
deals with it in conformity with its purpose and in a manner which
does not prejudice the interests of the community or impede the co-
owners from using it according to their right." The law on horizontal
property also specifically prohibits the owner from carrying out activities
in the apartment or elsewhere in the property which are "damaging to
the property [as a whole], immoral, dangerous, inconvenient or unsan-
itary.""..3 Finally, in keeping with the ready access to judicial authority
which the law offers the co-owners, the board of owners may obtain
an order expelling the malefactor for as long as two years." 4
The control which this law gives the condominium community over
the private conduct of their neighbors cannot merely be attributed to
Spanish moral sensibilities. The power which the community enjoys to
control conduct anywhere on the premises is a feature of the concept
of this community as co-ownership, for condominium residents are more
restricted in their conduct than leasehold tenants. The Spanish draft law
108. Id. at 351; Star Lake North Commodore Ass'n v. Parker, 423 So. 2d 509 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
109. See Barnett and Klein Corp. v. President of Palm Beach - A Condominium,
Inc., 426 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (where a regulation was applied in a
discriminatory fashion).
110. See Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (regulation could not be retroactively applied).
Ill. White Egret Condominum, Inc., 379 So. 2d at 346 (regulation was inconsistent
and ambiguous).
112. La. Civ. Code arts. 667-669.
113. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 7, para. 3, 21 July 1960, de
la Jefatura del Estado.




on horizontal property required notoriety of the owner's misconduct as
a condition for disciplinary measures." 5 This provision would have fol-
lowed the Law on Urban Leases which permits expulsion of a tenant
who is openly engaging in immoral, dangerous, inconvenient, or un-
sanitary activities.'' 6 However, the legislator deleted the requirement of
notoriety from the law as enacted." 7 Moreover, the Law on Urban
Leases permits a landlord to terminate the lease of a tenant who "in-
tentionally" damages the property. The Horizontal Property Law does
not require intent.' One author concludes, "the objective ambit of the
Law on Horizontal Property for application of the sanction is much
broader than that recognized by the Law on Urban Leases.""19
Immoral activities are particularly troublesome grounds for eviction
from the condominium. Generic definition of immoral activities is dif-
ficult and the courts have proceeded on a case by case basis. 2" Unit
owners have been expelled for conducting a trade in prostitution, for
providing a place of assignation for couples, and for conducting illegal
gambling activities.12' Such activities need only occur to be grounds for
exclusion, they need not have publicity.
An activity in one unit would only be inconvenient to neighbors if
it had- consequences outside the apartment. Such activities deprive or
hinder other residents in the normal and adequate use and enjoyment
of the property and include noise, vibration, production of gases, odors,
dust, or the like. Unsanitary activities are also grounds for eviction. 2 2
If any of the foregoing grounds for expulsion exist, the board of
owners notifies the offending resident that he will be disciplined unless
he desists.'2 3 Notification is a condition precedent to judicial action.
Spanish commentators consider the system "agile and flexible" as the
board may proceed to court any time after notifying the resident. 24 The
court may allow the offender additional time before hearing the case
and, after finding the owner responsible for the acts alleged, may expel
him from his home for as long as two years. Expulsion is justified,
according to one authority, for an injunction "prohibiting the harmful
or disruptive activities solves nothing for these will continue notwith-
standing the prohibition."' 25
115. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 118.
116. Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos, Art. 114 (7a)(8a).
117. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 118.
118. Id. at 120. An act is damaging if it "diminishes the patrimonial value of the
property, interpreting 'property' as the combination of common and private elements
which compose it. The damaging activity should have repercussions in the common areas
or in the floors or units of the other owners."
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 123.
122. Id. at 124.
123. Id. at 130-32.
124. Id. at 128.
125. Id. at 129.
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An owner who has been temporarily expelled loses only his right
to live on the premises. He may lease or sell the apartment, and the
new occupant takes possession as though no violation had occurred.', 6
An owner out of possession, whether by choice or expulsion, remains
liable for his share of repairs and common expenses. If the malefactor
returns to the premises and commits the same offense, he may once
again be expelled for as long as two years. 127
Individual Action
Louisiana condominium dwellers are owners of contiguous property
and shareholders of a corporation. Any damage which an owner causes
should be categorized as a harm to one of these two relationships.
Although residents own certain property in common, this property is
managed by the corporation. Inasmuch as the responsibilities of the
incorporated unit owner's association include regulation of commonly
owned property and assessment of fees, an owner's breach of misconduct
in either of these areas is an injury to the corporation, not damage to
particular owners. Conduct by one resident which causes direct injury
to a neighbor should be categorized as a breach of an obligation of
neighborhood, the tort of nuisance. A resident should be able to obtain
redress of a nuisance on the same conditions as the owner of a detached
house.'2 Misuse of the common areas or violation of a condominium
regulation is an injury to the corporation and only harms other residents
indirectly, unless the activity amounts to a nuisance. Louisiana corporate
shareholders have no standing to sue one another to redress this indirect
injury. 2 9 The shareholder may only sue the offender on behalf of the
corporation in a derivative action. 3 Similarly, the unit owner's asso-
ciation might sue a member to compel payment of delinquent assess-
ments, but these arrearages are not an injury to any other member in
his individual capacity.'
126. Id. at 148.
127. Id. at 147. "in light of the possibility of repeated infractions it would be desirable
to adopt solutions similar to those provided in foreign legislation, some of which permit
forced sale of the floor or unit or imposition of strong economic sanctions, including
imprisonment of the malefactor."
128. Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971); Hillard v. Shuff,
260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1971).
129. Ault & Wiborg Co. of Canada v. Carson Carbon Co., 181 La. 681, 160 So.
298 (1935).
130. La. Code Civ. P. art. 596. Similarly, an individual unit owner may not sue
officers of the condominium association for breach of corporate responsibilities. Where
unit owners and the association sued former officers of the association for entering self-
dealing contracts, a Florida court held that the allegation charged a breach of fiduciary
duty which only the association could vindicate. Avila South Condominium Association
v. Kappa Corporation, 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1976).
131. Provisions of the non profit corporations statute relating to subscriptions for
shares are applicable by analogy. La. R.S. 12:211(C) (1969) states, "subscriptions for
shares ... may be enforced by the corporation in its own name ......
1985]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The board of owners of a Spanish condominium has no powers
other than those of the apartment owners acting collectively.'32 The
board is not a legal entity. The law gives this group no status which
the co-owners of property would not have outside the statute. "[Tihe
community constituted in a regime of horizontal property lacks the
attributes of legal personality, for in principle it is the members who
compose it and not the group as such which are subjects of rights and
duties ... ."I" Consequently there is no distinction between an injury
to the board of owners and an injury to the property owned in common.
The Law on Horizontal Property authorizes the owners to elect a
president to act for them in court. 3 4 His sole function is to represent
the community, and he has no authority to act unilaterally on its
behalf.'35 The board of co-owners must in each case authorize the
president to act. Moreover, the authority of the president of the com-
munity to sue on its behalf does not exclude standing by other owners.
3 6
The Spanish interpret an owner's violation of the charter through
immoral, damaging, or unsanitary conduct in an apartment or by uni-
lateral modification of the common elements as damage to the property
owned in indivision. It is injury to each owner and each may bring suit
against the offender. "[Tihe fact that Article 12 of the law specifically
confers on the president of the community legal representation is not
an impediment to each owner exercising steps necessary to defend the
interest in the common property, including suits against the president
and the other co-owners. . . ."I" An owner suing to redress injury to
common property, whether it is actual property damage or merely mis-
conduct of another resident diminishing his enjoyment, must act for the
benefit of the condominium community.'36 As the interest which has
been injured is his interest in the common property, he must divide any
award of damages among the co-owners. However, he need not allege
that he is suing on behalf of the community.
An owner also has interests in his separate property apart from his
stake in the community. Contiguous neighbors may injure one another's
separate property without harming the common property or impairing
132. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 55.
133. Id. at 56.
134. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal, num. 49/1960, art. 12, 21 July 1960, de la Jefatura
del Estado.
135. Mufioz, supra note 63, at 22.
136. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 77.
137. Id. In a decision of the Supreme Tribunal of 28 April 1966, ratified on 23 April
1970, the Court established that the owners in a community may undertake all types of
actions for compensation or indemnification for injury which has been caused to them
both in reference to their individual units and to the common elements "for those damages
in the former and in the latter instances affect individual rights, which necessarily require
use of the common property." Mufioz, supra note 63, at 22.
138. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 79-80.
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the enjoyment of the community as a whole. In such cases the aggrieved
owner brings suit on his own behalf, 3 9 and the president of the board
of owners is without standing. 140
Conclusion
Louisiana might have developed a civilian approach to condomi-
niums. This paper has shown that neither of the two legal principles
which distinguish the condominium are necessarily alien to civilian think-
ing. Louisiana courts might have recognized horizontal division of im-
movables above the ground without impairing any important policies of
mineral ownership. It might also have been recognized, as it was by
French authorities, that commonly owned property should remain in
compulsory indivision when it serves the interests of, separate estates.
Unlike the experience in France and the common law jurisdictions, where
condominium legislation was needed only to regulate problems of com-
munity governance and to attack abuses of purchasers by developers,
Louisiana required legislation to alter basic concepts in our property
law before it could have condominium ownership.
Finding this need for legislation, the Louisiana legislature might have
drafted it in the interstices of the Civil Code, adapting an institution
such as ownership in common to meet new economic and social needs
of urban living. The Spanish experience demonstrates that the features
of a condominium scheme which is based on a modified concept of
ownership in common can be quite different than the characteristics of
a community in which the residents are corporate shareholders.
One of the distinguishing features of the Spanish. approach is -the
ease of constituting a horizontal property regime. In Louisiana expensive
legal talent is invariably required to prepare and register the declaration
and bylaws. In Spain the regim6 exists as soon as the stories are sold
separately. The community may operate without bylaws on the basis of
the same codal articles which regulate relations between other types of
co-owners. Analyzing the condominium as a form of ownership in
common carries the disadvantage of allowing one dissenting resident to
prevent any modification in the common property. However, this same
characteristic of the Spanish system protects minorities from oppressive
regulations which a majority might enact, permitting judicial challenge
on the ground that the regulation limits their enjoyment of common
property. As a form of common ownership, the community also has
more ready access to courts to adjudicate internal disputes between
owners than the shareholders of a Louisiana unit owners' association.
As previously noted, some Spanish authorities maintain that the role of
courts in sorting out disputes among co-owners is too significant, par-
139. D. Jos6 Maria Manresa y Navarro, supra note 59, at 440.
140. J. Caballero Gea, supra note 70, at 62.
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ticularly in a large condominium community where the residents may
be constantly bickering before a judge if they are permitted to appeal
every prejudicial decision of the majority. Corporate decisions in Lou-
isiana enjoy more internal finality than decisions by a board of owners
in Spain.
The universal capacity of the residents of a Spanish horizontal
property community to sue and be sued by one another may be the
least desireable characteristic of conceptualizing the condominium as a
type of ownership in common. If the source of contention involves the
entire community, one resident should ordinarily take action against
another only when the executive authorities of the condominium have
declined to assert the community's interests. In such cases a Louisiana
condominium resident could probably meet the requirements for a share-
holders' derivative action. Importing this aspect of Spanish horizontal
property to Louisiana might encourage litigation without offering any
additional protection to residents.
This examination of Louisiana condominium law in a civilian
perspective is not intended to advocate adoption of the Spanish approach
to horizontal ownership. Although some of its features might benefit
Louisiana law, there are others which are inappropriate for condominium
communities containing hundreds of residents. The latter should be
managed as corporations. This comparison is offered to encourage com-
parative analysis of law as a basis for future legal reform so that we
can, when we choose, build on the foundation of our own legal tra-
ditions.
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